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Term Structure Puzzles 
The subject of interest rates has probably 
never received the attention from both the 
financial and nonfinancial press that it has in 
the last two and one-half years. The unusual 
behavior of interest rates here and abroad has 
been noted in recent reports of  well-known 
international institutions such as the Bank for 
International Settlements (B. 1.5.) in Basel, 
Switzerland. In its 52nd Annual Report, the 
B.I.S. paid particular attention to the behavior 
of interest rates: 
"The behavior of  interest rates over the past 
twelve to eighteen months has not only been 
characterized by very high and variable-
nominal interest rates, but interest rates have 
come to seem unusually high in real terms, 
especially considering the weakness of  busi-
ness activity ... These developments may be 
explained by a number of  both independent 
and interdependent forces, varying in 
strength between countries, but frequently 
originating in the United States and sub-
sequently spreading to other countries." 
Economists in the u.s. also appear puzzled 
by the unusual behavior of interest rates. 
With the rate of inflation (CPI) from June 1981 
to June 1982 measuring 7.1  percent, the aver-
age 12.57 percent rate for the one-year Trea-
sury bill in June seemed hardly consistent. 
Even with the rate decline in the last six 
weeks, rates are still historically high for 
a period of recession. 
Term structure 
In explaining the behavior of interest rates, 
economists often rely on two paradi'gms-
the Fisherequation, which describes the level 
of interest rates, and the "exceptional theory" 
of the term structures, which describes the 
relation among interest rates on assets of dif-
ferent maturities. 
Named after the American economist Irving 
Fisher, the Fisher equation relies on the argu-
ment that borrowers and lenders realize that 
interest rates ought to reflect any loss in real 
pu rchasi ng power  due to inflation, and there-
fore must capture the anticipated capital loss 
in an inflation premium. According to the 
equation, interest rates must also have a 
"real" component, determined by underly-
ing "real factors" such as the aggregate pro-
ductivity of capital in the economy. The sum 
of  the two components sets the level of inter-
est rates and, in theory, should approximate 
the observed market rates of interest. 
The expectational theory of the term struc-
ture, largely the invention of British Nobel 
Laureate Sir John Hicks, argues that since 
individuals can trade financial assets of dif-
ferent maturities, there must be an equi-
librium relationship among the returns on 
these assets across the enti re spectru m of 
maturities. In a world in which individuals 
have similar risk preferences, the Hicksian 
argument suggests that the observed long-
term interest rate must equal the geometric 
average of  the currently observable short-
term interest rate and future expected 
short-term interest rates. This argument has 
led to rules-of-thumb for analyzing term 
structures. For example, a rising term struc-
ture-long-term rates higher than short-rates 
-by  this theory would mean that the market 
expects short-term rates to increase in the 
future. In this way, the average of  the current 
and future expected short-term rates would 
equal the presently available return on the 
long-term asset. 
If current short-term interest rates rise there 
mayor may not be a corresponding rise in 
long-term interest rates. The reason is that 
expected futu re short-term rates cou Id move 
in the opposite direction to leave the average, 
and hence the long-term rate, unaffected. 
Nonetheless, movements in short-term rates 
theoretically have some impact on longer 
dated securities, with the impact smal.ler the 
longer the maturity of  the asset. IP~cdl~rr©\ll  JJ«~~~rrw~ 
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While considerable past empirical evidence 
favors both the Fisher equation and the 
expectational theory, the two related para-
digms have more recently come under criti-
cism. Nothing disturbs theory quite like the 
reality of high real interest rates in the U.S. 
These high real rates have made many sug-
gest that an "uncertainty premium" needs to 
be added to the Fisher equations. Recent 
studies of the relationship between the vari-
ability of short- and long-term interest rates 
have also led to some serious questioning of 
the expectational theory ofthe term structure. 
Long-term rates appear to be too volatile in 
relation to short-term rates to be consistent 
with the Hicksian expectational theory. 
Rate volatility and policy 
On October 6, 1979; the Federal Reserve 
announced a major change in its monetary 
control procedures. The Federal Open 
Market Committee would no longer conduct 
open market operations (purchase and sell  . 
u.s. government securities) with the aim of 
keeping fluctuations in the Federal funds rate 
within a narrow band of 50-1 00 basis points 
between Committee meetings. Instead, it 
would attempt to control monetary growth 
by controlling the reserves of  the banking 
system, principally nonborrowed reserves. 
Many economists expected this change to 
lead to greater volatility in short-term interest 
rates but only small, if  any, changes in the 
volatility of long-term interest rates. In fact, 
both short- and long-term interest rates 
became much more volatile after October 6, 
1979. 
The increased volatility of both short- and 
long-term interest rates has not been restricted 
to the United States. The West German Fed-
eral Republic provides a parallel example. To 
measure the volatility in interest rates across 
the term structure, we have computed the 
standard deviation in the change in interest 
rates of assets of different maturities for two 
periods, February 1976-September 1979 and 
November 1979-December 1981. *  This 
measure, for both the U.S. and West Ger-
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many, shown in Chart 1, might be described 
as the "term structure of yield volatility." As 
expected, the term structure of  yield volati I  ity 
is generally downward sloping because 
short-term rates are usually more volatile 
than long-term rates. 
In the period between February 1976 and 
September 1979, the term structures of  yield 
volatility for the U.S. and West Germany 
were surprisingly alike, that is, the interest 
rates in both countries were almost equally 
volatile. After October 1979, the term 
structures of yield volatility rose for both 
countries. Both long-term and short-term 
interest rates in the two countries became 
more volatile, butthe increase was greater for 
the U.S. where long-term rates appeared 3-4 
times more variable than before. 
The expectational theory of  the term structure 
argues that current and expected short-term 
rates "determine" long-term rates. Whatthen 
is the pre- and post-October 1979 relation-
ship between changes in the rate on the 
shortest asset and changes in rates on assets 
of longer maturities? 
I  n Chart 2 we have plotted for the U.S. the 
simple (contemporaneous) correlations be-
tween the changes in the 3-month Treasury 
bill rate and the changes in rates on U.s. 
Government assets of maturities up to 10 
years. They show that longer-dated U.S. gov-
ernment securities appear more sensitive to 
changes in the yield on the 3-month Treasury 
bill after October 1979. 
Before October 1979 the change in the Ger-
man 3-month interbank rate had little relation 
to changes in rates on longer-maturity Ger-
man government bonds (also Chart 2). How-
ever, after October 1979, long-term German 
interest rates apparently became much more 
sensitive to changes in German money mar-
*Data for the German term structure include yields on 
Federal government bonds (including the Federal rai Iway 
and post office) for maturities of  one to ten years, and the 
three-month interbank rate. U.S. data are for u.s. Trea-








CORRELATION:  CHANGE IN SHORT·TERM RATE 
WITH CHANGE IN RATES ON LONGER MATURITY BONOS' 
Years To Malufllv 
'The short-term rate for Germany is the 3.month interbank rate; the short-rate for 
the u.s. is the 3-month Treasury bill rate. 
ket rates. Since long-term interest rates influ-
ence decisions on residential construction 
and business fixed investment, this increased 
sensitivity is worth noting. 
"Coupling" or "Oecoupling" 
A country can partially insulate itselffrom the 
financial conditions in other countries by 
allowing its exchange rate to adjust. If interest 
rates rise abroad and the home country 
wishes to keep its domestic interest rates from 
following the trend, it can choose, as a matter 
of policy, to allow its exchange rate to depre-
ciate. Thus, under a system of floating ex-
change rates some "decoupling" of interest 
rate movements can occur because exchange 
rates wou  Id move to reflect the interest rate 
differentials between countries. 
Chart 3 shows the degree of "decoupling" 
and "recoupling" between American and 
West German interest rates in the period 
February 1976-September 1979 and the 
period November 1979-December 1981 
when the value of  the u.s. dollar rose in the 
exchange markets. The simple correlations 
between changes in the 3-month U.5. Trea-
sury bill rate and changes in rates over the 
entire German term structureshow that Ger-
man interest rates were relatively insensitive 
to changes in short-term u.S. rates in the 
earlier period. In the later period, however, 
long-term  German  rates  seem  remarkably 
sensitive to changes in U.S. money market 
rates. 
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'None of the correlations in  the earlier period  are significantly different frorr 
zero. For the latter period all correlations for 1-10 years maturities are statistic 
ally different from zero at the .99 significance level. 
While in theory interest rates can be de-
coupled internationally by permitting ex-
change rates to adjust, in practice, exchange 
rate intervention can recouple rates, causing 
them to move in tandem across countries. 
The reason is simple enough. When a coun-
try purchases its own currency in the foreign 
exchange market, the action has the effect of 
reducing domestic liquidity, causing interest 
rates to rise. But such intervention would 
more likely result in related changes in short-
term rates than in long-term rates. 
In our example, changes in U.5. short-term 
rates appear to have had a substantial impact 
on German long-term rates. The reason for 
this inter-relationship is a mystery only partly 
explained by the expectational model of  the 
term structure. Long-term German interest 
rates may be reflecting the expectation that 
future u.s. short-term rates will be higher and 
that the Bundesbank, the German central 
bank, will take policy actions to prevent the 
Deutschemark from depreciating. Thus the 
long end of  Germany's term structure may be 
reflecting a forecast of future u.s. short-term 
rates and the expected behavior of  the Ger-
man central bank. 
We shou Id note that simple correlations 
between interest rates are not sufficient to 
confirm a casual relationship. The interaction 
between u.S. and German interest rates 
could be produced by a common third factor 
which these correlations have neglected. 
Whether the change in the Federal Reserve's 
monetary control procedures is the cause of 
higher domestic interest rates or  whether high 
interest rates are the result of an anti-
inflationary monetary policy, regardless of 
the control rule employed, is still an open 
question. Forthe international market, the 
puzzle may be the apparent increase in the 
interdependence of interest rates across 
oceans. The high U.5. rates appear to have 
had rippling effects on foreign long-term as 
well as short-term interest rates. 
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(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commercii:d Banks 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total # 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits -.adjusted 
Savings deposits - t6tal 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+ )/Deficiency (  -) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  + )/Net borrowed( - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percerlt 
9,297  6.1 
10,630  8.1 
4,817  12.1 
3,413  6.3 
456  2.0 
1,452  108.5 
54  0.9 
1,387  - 9.3 
1,317  - 3.1 
1,072  3.7 
669  2.2 
15,273  18.2 
14,f054  18.5 
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